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Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.), Remembering Socrates: 
Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press, 2006, ISBN: 0-19-927613-7, £40.00 
 
 
Remembering Socrates is a collection of twelve papers presented at a conference held 
in 2001 in Athens and Delphi to commemorate the 2400th anniversary of Socrates’ 
death.  Since the full proceedings had been edited by V. Karasmanis under the title 
Socrates: 2400 Hundred Years Since His Death (Delphi: European Cultural Centre of 
Delphi, 2004), the publication of the present volume, which contains a selection of the 
papers presented in 2001, gave the editors (and, presumably, the authors) the 
opportunity for a second process of distillation.  The yield is as follows: C. Natali: 
‘Socrates’ Dialectic in Xenophon’s Memorabilia’;  G. Seel, ‘If you Know What is 
Best, you Do it: Socratic Intellectualism in Xenophon and Plato’; C.H. Kahn, 
‘Socrates and Hedonism’; T. Irwin, ‘Socrates and Euthyphro: The Argument and its 
Revival’; L. Brown, ‘Did Socrates Agree to Obey the Laws of Athens?’; V. Politis, 
‘Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato’; D. Charles, ‘Types of definition in the 
Meno’;  V. Karasmanis, ‘Definition in Plato’s Meno’; T. Scaltsas, ‘Sharing a 
Property’; C.C.W. Taylor, ‘Socrates the Sophist’; J.M. Cooper, ‘Arcesilaus: Socratic 
and Sceptic’, M. Frede: ‘The Early Christian Reception of Socrates’. 
 
The intriguing title of the book prompts the questions ‘how is “to remember” 
to be interpreted in this context?’, ‘who is supposed to remember, or to have 
remembered, Socrates: the authors or the subjects of the articles?’  While the former 
could at best commemorate Socrates as opposed to remembering him, some of the 
latter never were in a position to ‘remember’ him, at least if we keep to the 
conventional sense of the verb, namely to recall acquaintance with particulars 
encountered in the past.  As it is, the contributors simply interpret in their various 
ways the evidence contained in a number of ancient sources which deal with Socrates 
and Socratic themes.  Since the editors appear to have decided to give the contributors 
a free hand, there is no point in drawing attention to obvious gaps in the treatment of 
the available evidence, such as Aristotle’s views on Socrates.  As a result, the present 
collection is, and could hardly have avoided being, a hotchpotch, both 
methodologically and philosophically.  Yet it is nonetheless, in more ways than one, a 
superior hotchpotch.             
 2 
 
In choosing to concentrate on Xenophon’s Socratic reminiscences in the 
Memorabilia, Carlo Natali and Gerhard Seel, alone of all the contributors, interpret 
memory and remembering proprio sensu.  Theirs are timely pieces which usefully 
complement the current reassessment of Xenophon’s Socratic writings, a 
reassessment to which the new Belles-Lettres edition (2000) of the Memorabilia by 
M. Bandini and L.-A. Dorion’s splendidly testifies.  Natali is concerned to highlight 
differences between Xenophon’s and Plato’s accounts of Socrates’ dialectics and 
ethical intellectualism.  His close reading of selected passages in the Memorabilia 
supports his contention that Xenophon’s Socrates had a richer, more positive, 
conception of dialectics and the moral life than his counterpart in Plato’s dialogues, at 
least as he is ordinarily interpreted.  Indeed, so Natali argues, the Socrates of the 
Memorabilia is consistently portrayed as actively seeking to improve his interlocutors 
as men and citizens, as opposed to merely confuting them.  Furthermore, he does offer 
definitions of ethical concepts, and expects his definitions to be action-guiding.  To be 
so, they must be adopted by agents whose self-control (enkrateia) and moderation 
(sōphrosunē) are sufficiently developed to enable them to profit from the moral 
knowledge that Socrates seeks to impart.  In so building enkrateia into moral 
knowledge, Xenophon’s Socrates, as interpreted by Natali, succeeded where Plato’s 
Socrates did not, namely in accommodating passion and emotion into his conception 
of the best life for humans to lead. 
  
Seel covers much the same exegetical ground as Natali, but with a heavier 
philosophical hand.  To analyse the views that Xenophon ascribes to Socrates, he 
relies on an oversimplified modern taxonomy of ethical theories, without pausing to 
ask himself how far such taxonomy can assist us in clarifying the ethical views of the 
ancients.  Consequentialism is taken to be the only alternative to a deontological 
approach to morality.  Deontology itself receives the thinnest characterisation possible 
so as to encompass both Kant’s ethics and the view, as expressed by Socrates at Mem. 
IV.5.6 (Seel’s T15), that self-control enables a person to acquire the knowledge of 
what is good and bad, a knowledge that constitutes the most reliable guide to action in 
practical matters.  Unsurprisingly, a close examination of the text itself later leads 
Seel to conclude that Xenophon’s Socrates is not, after all, a pure deontologist, but 
that his version of intellectualism, which is itself ‘meta-ethical’ in nature, also 
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includes elements of prudentialism and relativism.  Seel concludes that although 
Xenophon’s account of Socrates’ intellectualism is not entirely consistent, it is 
nonetheless historically valuable in so far as it largely overlaps with the picture 
presented in Plato’s so-called ‘early’ dialogues.  
 
For most of the other contributors to the volume, ‘remembering Socrates’ 
merely consists in writing an article about one or the other of the major Socratic 
themes in Plato’s dialogues.  So it is with C.H. Kahn who addresses the cluster of 
issues centring on Socrates’ defence of hedonism in the Protagoras.  Far from 
representing the views of either the historical Socrates or indeed of Plato himself, 
Socrates’ formulation of the doctrine of hedonism, so Kahn argues, is a cunning move 
on Plato’s part to highlight Protagoras’ lack of philosophical acumen before creating 
the occasion for Socrates to formulate his famous definition of akrasia as 
miscalculation and to introduce, as stemming from it, his equally famous thesis of the 
unity of the virtues.  Any interpretation that succeeds in knitting together Socrates’ 
three main arguments in that puzzling dialogue is much to be welcomed, and Kahn’s 
warrants the wide diffusion that he is obviously looking for it.  It might have been 
gracious, all the same, to inform the reader that this particular article had already 
appeared, in an identical form, not only in Karasmanis (2004), but also in A. Havliček 
and F. Karfik (edd.) Plato's Protagoras: proceedings of the third symposium 
platonicum pragense, Prague, Oikoumene, 2003.   
 
Lesley Brown, for her part, does acknowledge the two collections in which her 
analysis of the central argument in the Crito had appeared before being included in 
the present volume.  Her main concern lies with the grounds of political obligation, 
and her position is that no agreement can generate an obligation unless it has been 
publicly expressed, and the extent of its binding force recognised by the parties 
concerned.  This view leads her to dismiss the claims variously mooted in the Crito 
that Socrates, by remaining in Athens all his adult life and raising his family there, 
had entered into a tacit agreement with the laws of the city to abide by their decrees 
and, therefore, at the particular juncture recalled in the dialogue, to remain in prison to 
serve the death sentence that had been voted by the assembly.  Political obligation, 
she argues, is relevantly similar to the obligation to keep a promise.  Just as a promise 
is not binding unless the promisor has expressed, in whatever public form is 
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appropriate, his intention of carrying it out, tacit consent to obey the laws, however 
‘obtained’, has no sufficient performative force to ground a moral obligation.  Brown 
in effect transposes to the Crito the disagreement between Locke and Hume over the 
grounds of political obligation.  Although one might well deplore the inevitable 
anachronism that such an exercise involves, her piece makes for fascinating reading 
and should be of particular interest to political philosophers. 
 
Terence Irwin revisits the central argument of the Euthyphro.  A comparison 
between Plato’s handling of definition in that and other dialogues leads him to argue 
that the object of Socrates’ quest in the Euthyphro is the metaphysical property that 
causes all pious things to be so, and not, as might appear at certain stages of the 
argument, a concept, such as god-beloved, that is coextensive with the definiendum.  
This is hardly a novel thesis and, on its own, would not substantially have enhanced 
our understanding of this much studied dialogue.  More interestingly, in the second 
part of his article, Irwin turns, in the first place, to mediaeval treatments of the 
Euthyphro problem, likely either to have been undertaken as a result of reading 
Plato’s dialogue (Augustine) or independently of it (Aquinas and Scotus).  Later still, 
Socrates’ arguments against what is now called theological voluntarism were adapted, 
so Irwin shows, by the Cambridge Platonists and their contemporaries to fight battles 
of their own.  Thus Cudworth directed it against moral positivism, and Clarke used in 
the hope of undermining Hobbes’ attempt to ground the laws of nature in divine 
commands.  Although just about developed enough to whet the reader’s interest, this 
second, historical, section of Irwin’s article is yet too brief to do justice to the long 
posterity of the Euthyphro argument. 
 
The problem of definition is also taken up by David Charles and Vassilis 
Karasmanis, this time in the framework of the Meno.  Charles’ thesis is that Socrates 
asks, not for one, but for two different kinds of definition of virtue, the one to give the 
meaning of the word ‘virtue’, the other to give an account of the essence of the thing 
denoted by the word.  A detailed analysis of the passages involved leads Charles to 
conclude that Socrates fails to keep these two types of definition separate, and that, as 
a result, the main quest of the Meno is hampered by a serious confusion.  In the 
concluding section of his article, Charles suggests that this very confusion, which led 
the Platonic Socrates to reformulate Meno’s paradox at 80 E 2-5, is likely also to have 
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constituted a decisive element in Plato’s postulation of the theory of recollection, a 
theory which later led him, in turn, to posit the existence of other-worldly entities.  
One might well wonder at this point whether the theory of Forms could really have 
been the outcome of definitional confusion or, more likely, whether Socrates’ lack of 
interest in keeping the two kinds of definition separate was itself a sign that Plato was 
by then well on his way to the Forms. 
 
Vassilis Karasmanis’ account of the taxonomy of definition in the Meno is a 
model of clarity.  Having briefly set out Meno’s three attempted definitions of virtue 
and Socrates’ three definitions of space within the context not only of the dialogue but 
also of the Platonic corpus as a whole and the history of geometry at the Classical age, 
Karasmanis assesses the contribution that each attempt makes to Plato’s evolving 
thoughts on the nature of definition.  He concludes that for most of his writing life 
‘…although Plato gives techniques to refute bad definitions, and also some rules that 
a good definition must obey, still he does not have a method for finding definitions’ 
(p. 141).  Only in the Sophist, Karasmanis suggests, will Plato offer fresh insights into 
that topic.  Although Karasmanis’ choice of subject matter does not give him much 
scope for deploying philosophical originality, his article will be of value to all serious 
readers of the dialogue, from undergraduates to seasoned scholars.  
 
The nature of aporia in Plato’s so-called early dialogues is a rare area of 
(almost) consensus amongst scholars.  This is the happy state of affairs that Vasilis 
Politis would like to unsettle.  It is simply not true, he claims, that the Theaetetus 
marks a turning point in Plato’s presentation of Socrates, from gadfly which keeps the 
Athenian horse awake, to midwife of the mind who causes his interlocutors to 
formulate views of their own.  Even in the Protagoras and the Meno, so Politis 
claims, aporia does not only denote a condition of ‘speechlessness and 
inarticulateness in the face of Socrates’ demand for definitions’ (p. 96).  Far from it, 
since it also demonstrably refers to a state of puzzlement generated by an inability to 
settle between two opposing viewpoints on the same philosophical question.    While 
aporia in the first sense is cathartic and best illustrated by Laches’ candid 
acknowledgement of his inability to define the human quality he thought he knew best 
(194 A sqq), aporia in the second sense is ‘zētētic’ and clearly exemplified both in the 
discussion between Protagoras and Socrates as to whether or not virtue can be taught 
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(324 D and 348 C) and in Socrates’ exchange with Meno’s slave.  While Politis’ 
interesting distinction is likely to prompt most of us to revisit a number of passages in 
the corpus, it fails, at first blush, wholly to convince.  Indeed the expression ‘the 
aporia that you puzzle over’ (hē aporia hēn su aporeis, 324 E 1-2), which is Politis’ 
main piece of evidence in favour of the ‘zētētic’ kind of aporia, is not uttered by 
Socrates but by Protagoras.  Furthermore, the context of occurrence reveals that, 
appearances notwithstanding, neither man is actually in a state of puzzlement.  As for 
Meno’s slave, his aporia is not really ‘zētētic’; rather than puzzling over two 
contradictory answers to Socrates’ question, he goes first, unhesitatingly, for one 
solution before being firmly led to ‘see’ that the other solution is the correct one.          
       
For Theodore Scaltsas, Socrates is a pretext for developing what he hopes to 
be a novel theory of plural predication.  Three Stephanus pages of the Hippias Major 
(300-303) provide him with an angle from which to address this currently much 
debated metaphysical problem.  Hippias holds that, for any property, if two subjects 
possess it together, it necessarily follows that each possesses it individually, and if 
each subject possesses the property individually, it necessarily follows that both 
together possess it.  Socrates retorts that if Hippias and Socrates are two, it does not 
necessarily follow that each separately is two, and that if each is one, it does not 
necessarily follow that the two together are one.  Scaltsas translates the disagreement 
between Hippias and Socrates into the terminology of recent metaphysical theories, 
before suggesting that ‘plural subjecthood is, so to speak, an activity of the subjects 
involved (‘subject-ing’), not an entity that comes about from them’ (155).  The 
argument at this point becomes hard to follow in spite of Scaltsas’ several repetitions 
of its main point.  Perhaps because of his commitment to the goal of theoretical 
parsimony, his solution appears decidedly un-Platonic.  A better way to ‘remember’ 
Socrates, one might have thought, would have been to interpret the pages in question 
of the Hippias Major in the light of the longish passage in the Phaedo where Socrates 
ascribes a causal function to the forms: ‘... wouldn’t you hesitate to say that when one 
is added to one the addition is the cause of there coming to be two, or that when one is 
divided the division is the cause?  Would you not loudly protest that the only way you 
know of, by which anything comes to be, is by its participating in the special being in 
which it does participate; and that in the case just mentioned you know of no other 
cause of there coming to be two save coming to participate in duality, in which 
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everything that is to be two must participate, just as anything that is to be one must 
participate in unity; all these divisions and additions and suchlike subtleties you 
would have nothing to do with’ (101 B9 – C8, tr. Hackforth).  Might it be that the 
three pages in question of the Hippias Major would best be interpreted proleptically, 
as containing a puzzle that would soon lead Plato’s Socrates to the full-blown 
metaphysics of the Phaedo?  Now that would have been a pertinent question to ask.  
 
The authors of the last three articles aim at describing how the historical 
Socrates was viewed by some of his successors, both near and not so near.  In an 
elegantly short and exegetically neat piece, C.C.W. Taylor shows how Plato’s 
assessment of Socrates’ philosophical persona evolved over time.  While Socrates is 
presented in the Meno and the Protagoras as a knower and a genuine philosopher, it is 
suggested in the Sophist that he was a sophist, albeit a sophist of a noble kind, whose 
self-appointed task consisted in disinterestedly motivating others to seek truth and 
knowledge.  Through a detailed examination of the relevant pages of the Sophist (216 
sqq) and with frequent references to other dialogues, Taylor argues cautiously yet 
effectively that the definition of the sophist that is there presented fits the Platonic 
Socrates not too badly.  Like the Sophists, Socrates enjoyed engaging young men in 
prolonged conversations (adoleschiai), used the quasi mesmerizing effect that he had 
upon them to seek to further their education in aretē, and considered that being 
subjected to cross-examination and refutation was a necessary propaedeutic process to 
true learning.  Yet, to the extent that the pursuit of truth and the improvement of the 
soul of his young interlocutors were Socrates’ overriding aims, he was a sophist of a 
different, higher, order from those who went by that name at the time.  Does all this 
mean that the later Plato thought noble sophistry to be more like plain sophistry than 
philosophy?  Does this mean that he would by then have denied his master the title of 
philosopher, understood as one who conducts systematic investigations into ‘the 
fundamental structure of reality’ (168)?  Not without a touch of reluctance, Taylor 
admits that this might well have been so.   
 
In a meticulously researched piece drawing mainly on the writings of Cicero 
and Sextus Empiricus, John Cooper seeks to shed light on the difficult problem of 
what modern scholarship labels ‘Academic scepticism’, a descriptor that had no 
currency in antiquity.  He focuses on the figure of Arcesilaus, who headed the 
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Academy in the mid-270s, and was instrumental in setting it on the road to 
‘scepticism’.  Arcesilaus’ devotion to the figure of Socrates, so Cooper argues in 
Cicero’s wake, accounts for his otherwise atypical pedagogic methods.  Having urged 
his aspiring pupils to put forward their own views, Arcesilaus would engage in 
adversarial argument with them and, in the Socratic manner, rely on elenctic dialectics 
to refute whichever position they had adopted.  Such was his way of suggesting to 
them - without ever, of course, asserting it dogmatically - that nothing certain can be 
grasped by either the senses or the mind and, therefore, that the suspension of 
judgment in all matters is the only possible attitude.  So, Cooper asks, could 
Arcesilaus, after all, properly be described as a sceptic in the sense in which the new 
Pyrrhoneans of the first century A.D. understood the term, namely as one who 
inquires into philosophical questions, ponders them, but does not come to any definite 
conclusions on any of them?   Yes and no, goes Cooper’s answer.  Arcesilaus was a 
sceptic in so far as his philosophical life conformed to the ideal later defined by the 
new Pyrrhoneans.  But he was not a sceptic in so far as his grounds for suspending 
judgment were anything but Pyrrhonean.  Indeed Arcesilaus withheld assent because 
his passionate commitment to what he interpreted as the Socratic ideal of the best life 
to lead forbade him to take any position that was not fully justifiable by the highest 
standards there are, namely those of reason.  This was precisely the ideal that the 
Pyrrhoneans had abandoned.   
 
As can be seen, Arcesilaus’ Socrates (in Cooper’s interpretation) could not be 
more different from Xenophon’s Socrates (in Natali’s interpretation); while the latter 
is a knower who does not shy away from dispensing substantive moral advice, the 
former discourages us from assenting to any assertion that is not fully justifiable by 
the highest rational standards.  This particular discrepancy is characteristic of 
portrayals of Socrates throughout the ages.  As the present volume amply 
demonstrates, there is a complex interaction between how one conceives the 
philosophical task and how one constructs the figure of Socrates from the evidence 
available.  As for the additional and inevitable interaction between the exegete’s own 
philosophical credo and the varied ways in which the varied evidence on Socrates is 
interpreted, it gives us the (not too unwelcome) certainty that there will in future be 
many more volumes like the present one.     
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The ambivalence registered in the writings of a number of early Christian 
writers to the figure of Socrates further testifies to its enduring authority.  An 
interesting study of the early Christian reception of the Socratic inheritance concludes 
our volume.  It is signed by Michael Frede, alas since deceased.  As he shows, 
Socrates’ trial for impiety provided early Christians facing martyrdom with an 
effective argument against the pagan authorities which persecuted them. Indeed, 
pagans throughout the Roman empire, who held philosophy in high regard and 
viewed Socrates as a paradigmatic philosopher, generally acknowledged the nobility 
of his freely accepted death.  Knowing this, Christians facing prosecution for their 
faith found it expedient to emphasize the similarities between Socrates’ case and their 
own.  Like them, Socrates had been prosecuted for his religious beliefs, and if his 
condemnation to death had been unjust, so would that of Christians be.  If Socrates’ 
death had later reflected badly upon the Athenian assembly, so would in future that of 
Christian martyrs upon the Roman authorities.  But this particular strategic intent, 
Frede also demonstrates, was counterbalanced by another one, stemming from the 
Christians’ wish to dissociate themselves from the prevailing pagan culture which 
forbade proselytizing and imposed participation in the cult of State deities.  To 
achieve this second aim, ancient Christian writers, as interpreted by Frede, 
deliberately sought to undermine pagan philosophy in general and Socrates, its central 
figure, in particular.  One way or another, therefore, early Christian interest in 
Socrates tended to be strategic and polemical rather than genuine and philosophical.  
This, so Frede suggests, explains why their writings do not display ‘a deep 
understanding of the actual Socrates’ (p. 202).  Pace Frede, however, this is not true 
of all early Christian writers, as Augustine’s City of God (bk VIII, chapter 3) shows. 
Augustine’s remarks on Socrates, while not especially profound or original, are 
nevertheless informed by a genuine interest in the history of philosophy.  What’s 
more, coming as they do from a master of polemics, they are notable for the 
dispassionate and objective tone in which they are written. 
 
Remembering Socrates is not an easy read and, for the most part, is not to be 
recommended for undergraduate consumption.  It contains some very good arguments 
and some very fine scholarship, often in the same articles.  As such, it should be of 
considerable interest not only to ancient philosophers but also to classicists concerned 
with the longue durée history of Platonism.  The book is well produced but lacks an 
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index locorum.  Misprints and other blemishes are: ‘felt in love’ for ‘fell in love (p. 6), 
sōprosune for sōphrosunē (p. 9), ‘is’ should be added before ‘his focus’ on p. 113, 
line 9, ‘the’ should be deleted before ‘Meno’ on p. 136, line -12, ‘to’ should be 
deleted before ‘assent’ on the last line of p. 174, and ‘question’ should be deleted 
before ‘to ask on the other side’ on p. 178, line 22.         
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